Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
government budget constraint.4 The existence of this constraint implies that in political equilibrium, current expenditure and tax decisions by the party in power are conditional upon the level of existing debt -in other words, the party in power follows feedback rules from current debt levels to expenditure and taxation. We would expect these feedback rules to exhibit electoral and partisan effects.
The purpose of this paper is to address these issues. We do so in two ways. First, we construct a two-party model of fiscal and debt policy such that: (i) the survival and partisan motives referred to above are explicitly modelled; (ii) the equilibrium debt feedback rules can be explicitly characterised even with an infinite horizon and stochastic re-election probabilities ;5 (iii) the predictions of the model are largely consistent with the empirical literature described above; (iv) there are additional empirical predictions about debt feedback rules.6 Second, we test the model on UK data. We choose the United Kingdom because it has a two-party system with clear ideological differences between the parties on spending and taxation, and thus corresponds more closely to our model than most other OECD democracies. We find that we can accept the overidentifying restrictions of the model, and we get sensible estimates of the key parameters.
Our model is based on Persson and Svensson (i989). Two parties with different preferences over the level of public good provision alternate in power, and each is forward-looking, and so takes into account the effect of debt accumulation on its successor in government. The innovation is that parties do not care about -or care sufficiently less about -policy outcomes when not in power. This means that when in power, parties face a 'quasi finite-horizon'; near to the end of their terms of office, they will therefore have the incentive to finance their expenditure with debt, knowing that they will not (with some probability) have to face the consequences for a while. This effect implies preelection debt expansion, and dominates the strategic debt effects of the Persson and Svensson type, which are also present in the model, albeit in a slightly different form.7 4 Of course the 'strategic debt' literature referred to above is based on the idea that the present government can 'tie the hands' of the successor government through the government budget constraint. However, in none of this literature are these debt feedback rules characterised explicitly, let alone investigated empirically. 5 It is worth noting that characterisation of a political equilibrium in an infinite-horizon model with stochastic re-election probabilities is non-trivial in itself. As Persson and Svensson say of their model: 'it is clearly desirable to extend the analysis to one with several periods, and to one where there is uncertainty about the nature of succeeding governments.' 6 Our analysis in this paper is also relevant to the empirical literature on policy feedback rules. Traditionally, only monetary policy was thought to react to state variables such as output employment or debt, and consequently, studies have tended to look for monetary, rather than fiscal, feedback rules (see e.g. Branson, I977; Masson et al. I994). Our theoretical results, which are not rejected by the data, suggest that in the United Kingdom, fiscal policies are used to help stabilise debt around a 'target' level. 7 As described in more detail below, the strategic effects in Persson and Tabellini are first order, in the sense that the incumbent party takes into account the effects of its debt policy on the spending and taxation decisions of its successor. By contrast, in our paper, the strategic effects are second-order, in that the incumbent takes into account the effects of its debt policy on its successor only insofar as the tax and spending decisions of the successor influence the debt that the incumbent party will inherit, should it be re-elected in future.
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section I presents the theoretical model, Section II defines and analyses political equilibrium, Section III presents econometric estimates for the United Kingdom, and Section IV concludes.
I. THE MODEL
Since the model will guide us in the empirical investigation, we keep it as simple as possible. In particular, the model is 'macroeconomic', that is, the objectives of the political parties are not derived from explicit micro-foundations and the private sector is not explicitly modelled. However, it is possible to construct 'approximate' micro-foundations for these objectives as we show in Appendix B. The economy evolves over an infinite number of time-periods t = I, 2 ... 00. At any time t, government expenditure can be financed by one-period public debt and tax revenues. The government budget constraint at time t can be written Bt = Gt-Tt+RtBt- (I) where BA, GA and Tt denote respectively the public debt/GDP ratio, the government expenditure/GDP ratio and the tax revenue/GDP ratio, and Rt= (i +rt)/(i +gt), where rt = rate of interest on one-period bonds, and gt= growth rate of real income.8 We assume9 that rt and gt are constant.
There are two political parties, Conservatives (denoted by the subscript c) and Socialists (denoted by the subscript s). Each party (i = c, s) has the following per period loss functions of government expenditure and tax revenue:
Cu l(Gt-Gf)2+ (T7t i)2 when party i is in power = 1 otherwise where Gi and T7 are party-specific targets for expenditures and tax revenues respectively, and #ui is the relative weight that party i places on attainment of the expenditure target. The form of loss function #ui(Gt -Gi)2 + ( Tt-T)2 is not arbitrary; it can be given a microeconomic justification.10 In Appendix B, a microeconomic model of the type analysed by Alesina and Tabellini (I990) or Persson and Svensson (I989) is presented. It is shown there that the indirect utility of an infinitely lived household over pairs Gt, Tt can be approximately expressed as ,t(Gt -G)2 + Tt where ,u, G are preference parameters, which may differ across households. So, party i can be thought of as representing households with preferences close to ui, GC, T7.
We now make an assumption on these parameters #ui, Gi, T7 which is sufficient to ensure that the predictions of our model are consistent with the stylised facts mentioned in the introduction; (IA Gs > G.5 Ts > T. a > a . 8 In an earlier version of this paper we showed that money, and therefore seignorage revenues could be introduced into the analysis without changing the results (Lockwood et al. I994).
9 The assumption that R is independent of Bt, is a strong one, and is made to keep the model tractable. If R is not too sensitive to Bt, the qualitative results obtained below will continue to be valid. 10 The assumption of quadratic loss functions is standard in the literature on monetary policy design (e.g. Barro and Gordon's model of inflation bias). So, the assumption is that socialist governments have higher expenditure and tax targets, and also place a greater weight on attainment of the expenditure target. (We test these assumptions directly for the United Kingdom in Section III below.) Returning now to the loss functions in (2), the key assumption" embodied in (2) is that when out of power, political parties do not care about economic policy outcomes.'2 As we shall see below, this assumption (together with the assumption of exogenous re-election probabilities) drives our results on electoral effects in Proposition 2; namely, near to elections, the party in power faces a 'quasi-finite horizon' and hence accumulates more debt. This assumption is at variance with the 'rational partisan' approach of Alesina and Tabellini and others, which assumes that parties care about policy outcomes equally whether in or out of power. So, it requires some justification. Some evidence is available from the political science literature; Laver and Hunt (I992) recently conducted a comprehensive survey of political 'expert opinion' in 25 parliamentary democracies; I,228 experts were surveyed of whom 355 responded. Two of the questions asked were; (i) 'Assess how far into the future members of each section of each party look when making important decisions about the membership of the government'; (2) Forced to make a choice, would party leaders give up policy objectives in order to get into government or would they sacrifice a place in government in order to maintain policy objectives? The average score given to the main UK parties for (i) was 3-07 (i -does not look to the future, 5 -looks many years to the future) and for (2) was I2-63 (Iwould give up office, 20-would give up policy). Scores for other OECD countries were similar.
-This indicates that: (i) there is some evidence for myopia of the party in power; (ii) there is somre evidence that parties are not as strongly attached to policies as the partisan model would suggest. The correct way to model (i) would be to give parties 'short' finite time-horizons -for example to postulate that they do not look beyond the end of their term of office. However, under this assumption, parties would behave profligately by taxing and spending so as to hit the targets in equation (2) in every period. If Gt > 7T, as seems reasonable, then debt would explode rapidly -i.e. myopia is not consistent with a stabilisation motive. The formulation in equation (2) avoids this problem. The answers to question (2) suggest that parties are willing to sacrifice policy objectives to (re)gain power. As we do not allow re-election probabilities to be endogenous (for ajustification of this, see below), we cannot model this trade-off directly. However, our specification in equation (2) attempts to capture the flavour of this trade-off in an indirect way.
It remains to specify the electoral process. We assume that elections take place in the beginning of every second period, so the elected party is in office for two periods, and the incumbent party has an exogenous probability " For an analysis of political equilibrium in monetary policy with a loss function similar to equation ( 12 The main results of our paper would go through if parties care sufficiently less about policy outcomes when out of power than in power.
I996] FISCAL
AND DEBT POLICY 899 o < q < -i of winning the election. In the period following an election (which we call election period and denote by the superscript e), there is no electoral uncertainty because the elected party knows that it will remain in office next period (which we call non-election period and denote by the superscript n). In non-election periods, there is electoral uncertainty since there is only a probability q of being reappointed in the next period. The assumption that re-election probabilities are exogenous obviously rules out the manipulation of policy instruments to increase the chances of reelection. Such a manipulation has been modelled as the outcome of a signalling game by Rogoff and Sibert (i 988) and Rogoff ( I990). This is deliberate; as we shall see below, one of the points of the paper is that our assumption that parties do not care (or care less) about policy outcomes when out of power yields an electoral cycle which is very similar to the one generated by Rogoff-type electoral manipulation.
II. POLITICAL EQUILIBRIUM
We model the interaction between the two parties as a two-player dynamic game; the dynamic game then provides us with a natural definition of political equilibrium. The structure of the game is simplified by defining variables in terms of deviations from targets. Let Gt, 7T be the expenditure and tax targets of the party in power at time t -given the electoral process, these are obviously random variables. The role of (II) is to ensure that the future cost of debt accumulation is positive; it is sometimes known as a 'no Ponzi game' condition. For any party i, the state at any time t is a triple comprising bt-1, and two binary variables recording which party is in power (i = c, s) and whether it is an election or a non-election period (j = e, n). The state equation is given by (4) plus the obvious rules that election years follow non-election years, and that the incumbent party stays in office with probability I (resp. q) in non-election (resp. election) years. A strategy for party i is a sequence of mappings from the history of the game to a policy choice (gt, rt, bt) if that party is in power. We will focus on equilibrium in Markov strategies, that is where (ge, ,r, bt) are constrained to depend on past history only through dependence on the current value of the state variable bt_1.
For two such strategies to be mutual best responses, it must be the case that i's strategy minimises L' taking the other party's strategy as given, i = c, s. This is a dynamic optimisation problem for party i, which is characterised by the following recursive, or Bellman, equations when party i is in . There, the strategic interaction is first-order; before an election, the incumbent rationally anticipates that it will lose the election with some probability and so directly tries to influence the tax and spending decisions of its successor by strategic choice of debt. In our model, the strategic interaction is second-order. That is, before an election (in a non-election year in our terminology), the incumbent rationally anticipates that it will, with probability I -q, lose the current election (hence the weight of (i -q) on At in (5 b)) and will subsequently win the next election with probability I -q. So, before an election, the incumbent has an incentive to use debt strategically in order to affect its successor's tax and spending decisions only insofar as these tax and spending decisions affect the debt that the present incumbent will inherit if he loses the current election and wins the next, an event which occurs with probability (i -q)2. Substitution of (8) into (5 b) gives Pe = qe + 82(i -q) 2pe//( I _ 9h82q). So, the second term in 3if measures the loss associated with losing and then regaining power. Note that this term is increasing in p1h (as long as Cph82q < I, which is the case in equilibrium).
Conditions ( We now investigate the properties of the political equilibrium, assuming that (I), (II) and the condition on q in Proposition I hold. These properties can first be presented as properties of the feedback rules on the deviation of debt from its target value, bt-, = Bt1 -Bt-1. This is the main theoretical result of the paper and deserves some comment. First, the intuition for the result is that as the probability of losing office comes closer, the government cares less about the future cost of public debt. This is demonstrated formally in the course of the proof, where it is shown that A' < /e, i.e. the marginal cost of a given level of inherited debt is lower when i is in power than out of power in election years. As a result, stabilisation policy is weaker in pre-election periods. Using the term introduced above, it is convenient to call it the quasi-finite horizon effect. This effect obviously follows from the assumption that parties do not care about policy outcomes when out of power.
Second, although there is an incentive for strategic choice of debt as described above, such incentives are dominated by the quasi-finite horizon effect. That is, although party i knows that it will regain power in the next election with some non-zero probability and so has a strategic incentive to reduce the debt accumulated by party h, this strategic effect is dominated by the quasi-finite horizon effect. Third, our model generates the same pattern of pre-election expansion in debt as in Alesina and Tabellini (I990), but for different reasons. In Alesina and Tabellini (I990), the overaccumulation is strategic; party i knows that when party h is in power it will spend on the 'wrong' kind of public good from party i's view; to prevent this, party i overaccumulates debt. In our model, it is due, to the quasi-finite horizon effect. Fourth, our model generates the same pre-election expansion in government spending and reduction in taxation as in Rogoff and Sibert (i 988) and Rogoff (i990). However, as remarked in the Introduction, these papers rely on a different mechanism to generate these effects: the government tries to signal its competence to the electorate by manipulating expenditure and taxation in preelection periods in an attempt to increase its re-election probability. Instead, in our paper, it is the 'quasi-finite horizon' effect that leads an electoral cycle in expenditure and taxation.
Finally, we confirm that the expected partisan effects are present, but that, surprisingly, the Socialists' higher propensity to tax exactly offsets their greater incentive to spend, so that the rate of accumulation of debt does not depend on the party in power. This result is due to the fact that in equilibrium, the debt accumulation coefficients (ip are equal; cpC = fp. This does not mean that over a term of office, both parties will accumulate equal amounts of debt. This is because the model is specified in deviation form (recall (3) and (4) Table I below as the 'true' data generating process. We set each parameter in turn to zero and generated 400 sets of data in each case. The 5 % critical value in each case was taken as that number which gave a proportion of rejections equal to 5 %. For example, to get an estimate of the 5 % critical value for the t-ratio on k2, we set k2 = o and all other parameters at the values given in Table i . The model was simulated 400 times giving 400 t-ratios for k2. We wish to test for significance in the left tail in this case, so the critical value for k2 was taken as the 5th percentile of the generated t-ratio. The results of this 16 In an earlier version of this paper, we estimated the model for the United States also. The results were not very supportive of our theory. However, although the United States is a two-party system like the United Kingdom, power is split between presidencies and congress which are elected at different times. Legislation on tax and spending is therefore often the result of a compromise between a Republican (Democrat) president and a Democrat (Republican) congress. This was the case after I982 under Reagan's presidency (see Palmer and Sawhill, I984) .
17 This is very clear from the survey of experts conducted by Laver and Hunt (I992). A panel of experts ranked UK parties (amongst others) on a scale from I -promote raising taxes to increase public services, to 20 -promote cutting public services to cut taxes. In the United Kingdom, the two main parties scored an average ranking of: Conservatives -I 7-2 i, Labour -5-35. Given the standard deviations of these rankings across experts (recorded in Laver and Hunt) it is easy to check that these differences are significant at conventional significance levels.
1 After allowing for four lags the number of observations is reduced to 34. Table gives parameter estimates, the third row gives asymptotic t-ratios and the fourth row gives estimated 5 % critical values. Estimates were derived using GMM with dpt, dp t_, det, det_1 and B_, Gt_ and t _ (i = 2,3,4) as instruments. The covariance matrix of the orthogonality conditions was estimated using a HAC with lag length i and Bartlett weights. The results were not qualitatively sensitive to either the choice of HAC estimation method or to the Bartlett lag length. Dropping one or two observations from either the beginning or the end of the sample alters the p-values slightly but does not qualitatively change the results. procedure for each of the parameters are given in Table I below the estimates. Critical values for the y2 joint tests of significance of (k1, k6) and [k3, (u-,)] respectively were computed in a similar fashion and are discussed below, in the text. GMM estimates of the parameters in (i6a) and (i6b) are given in Table I The political equilibrium is then characterised by (A 3), (A 6), (A 7), and (A 9) and the transversality condition (9). Note that the structure is recursive; a solution to (A 9) then implies solutions to (A 6), (A 7) which then imply solutions to (A 3). We also impose the inequality constraints A' > o, > o, g/ > o, i = c, s; these follow directly from (5) and (8). Call the solution to (A 3), (A 6), (A 7), (A 9) that respects these constraints a non-negative solution. So, from (A 6), (A 7), 'TF > /R4i 2 at the nonnegative solution.
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(ii) We now establish that there exists a unique non-negative solution (Tp*, 1p*), as defined above, to the pair of equations (A 9). First, note that for the solution to be non-negative, we can restrict our attention to solutions ( (ii) Proof that Tn > Tr, Te > Te
